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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
JURISDICTION FOR INHERITANCE TAXATION.
The scope of this article is necessarily limited to brief state-
ments of the various theories upon which a state imposes an
inheritance tax. The citations are not exhaustive. While
there have been many theories advanced, and sometimes
adopted, as the basis of inheritance taxation, the now generally
accepted one is that the inheritance tax imposed by the states
in this country is a tax on the transfer of the property from
dead hands to living ones.' It is not considered a tax on the
property involved in the transfer, nor is it a tax upon the
person to whom the property devolves, although it has some-
times been said to be a tax upon the right to have property
transmitted after death; neither is it a tax upon the use of
the privilege of making a will, because it is imposed even
though there be no will. The later discussions and the ex-
pressed theory of the newer statutes are practically in unison
in declaring that it is the transfer that is taxed.
At first glance it would therefore seem to be an easy matter
to determine what state or jurisdiction had the right to im-
pose a tax in any given case, for the jurisdiction in which the
transfer is effected would be the logical place to impose the
tax. But this is true only in a most limited sense. In the first
place taxing officials and courts too, will differ as to the place
where the property is transferred in contemplation of law, and
it is a peculiar anomaly that it really makes no difference
where the legatee or heir actually obtains possession of his
property. The place of getting actual physical possession is
an impotent fact and apparently has no bearing on the ques-
tion. So, although the tax is in theory a tribute levied by the
state on the transfer from the dead to the living, the right to
impose is based primarily on whether the state has any juris-
diction of any of the property involved.
Most of the inheritance tax statutes use as broad and as
general language as possible in describing the property, "the
transfer" of which is to be taxed: "All property within the
1. Knowlton v. Moore, (1900) 178 U. S. 41, 20 S. C. R. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969.
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jurisdiction of the Commonwealth ;,,2 "All estates, real, per-
sonal and mixed of every kind whatsoever ;-13 "Property shall
be within this state ;"' "Property within the state or within
its jurisdiction,' '5 are typical of the scope of the legislative
enactments, and these the courts have uniformly held are as
broad as the jurisdiction of the state that enacted them. Thus,
the question of legislative intent is superseded by the question
of whether under any theory it can be said that the property
under consideration is within the state. Neither the policy
adopted by the state, nor as limited by the courts as to the
jurisdiction to impose general property taxes on property, is
the guide to follow in solving the problem of inheritance tax
jurisdiction.6
In the very nature of the tenure of real property there can
be little or no question as to where its situs is for inheritance
taxation. Such taxation must necessarily be limited to the
state where the land is located, no matter where the domicile
of the owner may have been. Attempts have been made to
indulge in theories that might lead to its taxation in another
state. These have usually failed. The doctrine of equitable
conversion has been invoked to induce the court of decedent's
domicile to consider his land in another state as being con-
verted into personalty and thus taxable at the domicile, but
the courts have rejected the theory as untenable, one court
saying, "The question of jurisdiction of the state is one of fact
and cannot turn upon theories of fiction which, as have been
observed, have no place in a well adjusted system of taxation. '"
It will be seen later that the courts do not have the same hesi-
tancy in adopting theories in imposing such taxes on per-
sonalty.
All personal property, tangible and intangible, no matter
where actually located, and whether it has ever been within
the state or not, is subjected to an inheritance tax in the state
of the domicile of the decedent. This proceeds upon the prin-
2. Mass. Acts 1909 Chap. 527 Sec. 1.
3. Pa. Statutes 1887 Chap. 37 Sec. 1.
4. Ill. Laws 1909 p. 312.
5. Minn. G. S. 1913 Sec. 2271 (3).
6. Estate of Stanton, (1905) 142 Mich. 491, 105 N. W. 1122.
7. Estate of Swift, (1893) 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096. See also, Estate
of Curtis, (1894) 142 N. Y. 219, 36 N. E. 887; Connell v. Crosby, (1904)
210, III. 380. 71 N. E. 350; McCurdy v. McCurdy, (1908) 197 Mass. 248,
83 N. E. 881, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 329.
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ciple, which is theory only, that movables follow the person of
the owner, and are therefore to be considered as being where
the owner lives. A Minnesota resident dies owning a steam
yacht in Florida or a herd of cattle in Texas, and the value
thereof is taken into consideration in determining the Minne-
sota inheritance tax. The probate court of the domicile has
undoubted jurisdiction over such personalty, and the domi-
ciliary representative would administer that property and
effect a transfer of the title to the living owners. The state
of the domicile is where the transfer in theory takes place;
that is, where the rule of succession is established. But it is
plain that such tax rests wholly upon theory for its justifica-
tion, if the property is permanently physically absent from the
domicile.
The determining that the state of the domicile has jurisdic-
tion does not lead to the conclusion that the taxable situs has
been located there to the exclusion of any other situs. Find-
•ing it in one place does not mean that it is not at the same
time in another place. The state where tangible personal
property is found also has jurisdiction to impose a tax, though
the late owner was a non-resident. This is based upon fact
and not upon theory. A ground for the exercise of such juris-
diction is that the property has the protection of the laws of
the state where it is located and such laws are invoked "for
the reducing of it to possession when the change of ownership
is to be effected." 8 The new owner or the representative of
the decedent must go to such state to get the property and
perchance use the courts of that state to obtain the beneficial
use and enjoyment thereof. If the state where the property
of a non-resident decedent is found has such jurisdiction of the
property as would enable a resident creditor, for instance, to
have the property subjected to the payment of his debt against
the estate through probate proceedings, such property can
there be subjected to an inheritance tax. It must be conceded
though, that such a tax is not in reality a tax on the transfer
of the property in the same sense that the tax is imposed on
the transfer of the property of a resident decedent. It really
becomes analogous to a tax on the property itself for the trans-
fer takes place in the state of the domicile and the laws of
descent of that state determine the succession, and other laws
8. Callahan v. Woodbridge, (1898) 171 Mass. 595, 51 N. E. 176.
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of that state determine the validity and legal effect of any tes-
tamentary disposition. Some courts assert that it is only by
the law of comity that this is true and that any state has the
right and power to determine the succession of all property
within its borders upon the death of the owner.
When intangible personalty of a non-resident is considered,
still other theories and arguments are used to legally justify
the tax. Corporate stock, or the transfer of it, is taxed in the
state of the domicile of the corporation and the fact that the
office of the transfer agent or registrar is in the state of the
late owner's domicile, probably would make no difference.
The tax is here imposed upon the theory that such stock repre-
sents an interest in property within the taxing state,9 but
whether the corporation has any property within the state of
its creation is not a factor in determining the taxability of the
transfer of its shares. The taxing officials of some states,
particularly Illinois and Wisconsin, assert the right to impose
a tax on the transfer of property owned by the estate of a non-
resident in a foreign corporation, if any of the tangible prop-
erty of the corporation is within that state. No reported case
has as yet confirmed such right. If the corporation is incor-
porated in more than one state as are many railroad companies,
each state of incorporation imposes a tax on the transfer of the
stock owned by a non-resident decedent, but here again an-
other theory is used, for instead of taking the full value of the
stock into consideration, only such proportion of the value
is used as equals the proportion of the tangible property of the
company within that state, as compared with all of its tangible
property everywhere; and this is true, no matter where the
transfer office may be. This division of the value of the stock
is probably a concession toward substantial justice rather than
a logical conclusion. Such a corporation is doubtless a domes-
tic corporation in every state in which it is incorporated and
it does not detract from that character by being incorporated
in more than one commonwealth.
Stock in a national bank is subjected to an inheritance tax
in the state where the bank is located, although the owner lives
in another state.10 This is upon the theory that such a cor-
9. State ex rel. Graff v. Probate Court, (1915) 128 Minn. 371, 150 N.
W. 1094.
10. State ex rel. Graff v. Probate Court, supra. Greeves v. Shaw, (1899)
173 Mass. 205, 53 N. E. 372.
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poration is in a sense a citizen of the state where its place of
business is fixed by the law of its creation, though the state has
nothing to do with granting the franchise.
The situs of a: book account or promissory note due the
estate of a non-resident is considered to be at the domicile of
the debtor, no matter where the evidence of the debt may be
kept. The familiar principle that such claims have a situs at
the domicile of the creditor fails here, for the theory is that
while the claim followed the creditor in his life time, imme-
diately upon his death the debt follows the debtor. It is where
the debtor lives that the claim is enforcible. This reasoning
places this class of property on the same basis as tangible
personalty and the "transfer" is taxable where the property
is found, or can be sued for, if it cannot be reduced to posses-
sion by other means.1 But a state can impose a tax on the
indebtedness evidenced by a note even if the owner of the note
and the maker thereof are non-residents and the note was never
in that state, if it is secured by a mortage on real property in
such state.12 It can be safely said that this right has not yet
been established beyond all question and it may be that where
a mortgage does not pass title to the land that the mortgage
lien will not finally be considered sufficient to justify a tax in
the state where the land only is located.
A divided court in a recent Minnesota case 13 held that
where the creditor's estate could enforce a corporate bond se-
cured by real estate without going into the state where the
real property is located and where the corporation is domiciled,
that neither such domicile of the debtor nor location of the
realty gave sufficient jurisdiction to sustain a tax. This would
seem to make jurisdiction depend wholly upon whether the
debt could be enforced or the security realized upon in any
other state, and if it could, then the state of the debtor's domi-
cile or of the location of the mortgaged property must yield
its jurisdiction to the stronger claims of the other states. But
this probably does not go to the extent of introducing a doc-
trine of "comparative jurisdiction" nor of any reciprocal yield-
ing by one state to the stronger claims of another state.
11. Blackstone v. Miller, (1903) 188 U. S. 189, 23 S. C. R. 277, 47 L.
Ed. 439.
12. Rogers Estate, (1907) 149 Mich. 305, 112 N. W. 931.
13. State v. Chadwick, (1916) 133 Minn. 117, 157 N. W. 1076.
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Intangible property of some classes such as bonds, notes
and mortgages have been discovered to have still another situs
for inheritance tax purposes. If they are kept habitually with-
in a state for investment or safe-keeping in a state that is not
the domicile of the owner, nor of the debtor, they become sub-
ject to a tax in the state where so kept. This view has the
effect of giving such evidences of intangible property a sort of
independent situs of their own.1 4
There is still another though somewhat rare condition of
affairs to legally justify the state in imposing an inheritance
tax on the transfer of property where it may also be taxed by
other jurisdictions. The exercise of a power of appointment by
will, no matter where the property is situate, nor where the
donor of the power resided, nor where the beneficiaries of the
donor of the power lived, is taxable at the domicile of the tes-
tator exercising the power.1 5 This is upon the theory that it is
the exercise and not the creation of the power that actually
makes the "transfer", hence the tax is imposed where the trans-
fer takes place,-and that takes this discussion back "to the
point of beginning".
These more or less inconsistent theories necessarily lead to
the taxation of legacies and inheritances in two or more states
involving the same property, thus making double or repeated
burdens of taxation though not legally considered as double
taxation in the constitutional sense.' 6 There is no difference of
opinion about the real injustice of these conditions; there is
much difference as to the best way to remedy it. Mutually
satisfactory reciprocating statutes or a uniform law as to
"which situs" should control are the only classes of remedies
yet suggested. A discussion of the variations within such
classes and their apparent merits or defects would be beyond
the scope of this article.
WILLIAM J. STEVENSON.
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14. Estate of Tiffany, (1911) 143 N. Y. App. Div. 327, 128 N. Y.
Supp. 106; Wheeler v. New York, (1914) 233 U. S. 434, 34 S. C. tZ. 607,
58 L. Ed. 1030.
15. State ex rel. Smith v. Probate Court, (1914) 124 Minn. 508, 145
N. W. 390.
16. Blackstone v. Miller, supra.
